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NOTES
A Clarification of Indivisibility of Copyright
In 1945, David Goodis completed the novel Dark Passage and arranged
for publication of the book. Before it was published, he sold the exclusive
motion picture rights in the novel to Warner Brothers and the right of
serialized publication to Curtis Publishing Co. Dark Passage was first pub-
lished in eight installments of The Saturday Evening Post, a Curtis pub-
lication, with each issue containing a single copyright notice in the maga-
zine's name. Later, the book was published containing a copyright notice
in Goodis' name.
Warner Brothers produced a motion picture based on the novel and
subsequently assigned their contract rights to United Artists, who pro-
duced a television film series entitled "The Fugitive," which was broad-
cast weekly by American Broadcasting Co. In 1965, Goodis filed suit in
federal district court1 against United Artists and American Broadcasting
Co., claiming damages for copyright infringement Defendants were
granted summary judgment on the theory that the work had fallen into
the public domain because the copyright notice in the name of the maga-
zine, a "licensee," did not preserve Goodis' rights in the novel upon first
publication.' Held, reversed and remanded: Where a magazine has pur-
chased the right of first publication under circumstances which show that
the author has no intention to donate his work to the public, copyright
notice in the magazine's name is sufficient to obtain a valid copyright on
behalf of the author. Goodis v. United Artists Television, Inc., 425 F.2d
397 (2d Cir. 1970).
I. THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF COPYRIGHT
The United States Constitution gives Congress the authority to enact
copyright legislation.4 The underlying purpose of copyright law is to
"promote the progress of science and useful arts . . . ."' This is accom-
plished by securing to authors the exclusive control of publicizing their
work, thus enabling them to exploit freely the work's financial capabili-
ties. With this purpose in mind, courts have stated that "the provisions of
the copyright law are to be liberally construed to insure to the author
the product of his brain,"' and they have often been very reluctant to
hold that an author has suffered forfeiture of his copyright.'
'The district courts have exclusive jurisdiction of copyright cases. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1964).
217 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1964).
3 278 F. Supp. 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The district court also held that the contract between
Goodis and Warner Brothers clearly conveyed rights broad enough to encompass the television film
series, and that there was in fact no infringement. This point was reversed and remanded, with
a majority of the three-judge panel holding that the interpretation of the contract involved factual
issues which should not have been determined on a motion for summary judgment. See FEO. R.
Civ. P. 56(c).
4 U.S. CoNsar. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Id.; American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 291 (1907).
0 Harper & Bros. v. M.A. Donohue & Co., 144 F. 491, 496 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1905); Holmes v.
Donohue, 77 F. 179, 180 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1896).
'See, e.g., Bisel v. Ladner, 1 F.2d 436 (3d Cir. 1924); Maurel v. Smith, 271 F. 211 (2d Cir.
1921); Harns v. Stern, 229 F. 42 (2d Cir. 1916); American Press Ass'n v. Daily Story Publish-
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The present Copyright Act' was enacted in 1947 and is based largely on
the 1909 Act, which substantially revised the earlier copyright legislation.9
Prior to the 1909 Act, a copyright was secured by the author or proprie-
tor" depositing a copy of the title of his work with the clerk of the dis-
trict court in the district of his domicile." This procedure reflected the
idea that an author was expected to have exclusive control over his lit-
erary work before he chose to publish it." Under the 1909 Act and the
present law, copyright is secured by actual publication of the work with
notice of copyright in conformity with the Act." If the work is pub-
lished without such notice, it falls into the public domain.' Thus, initial
publication is all-important, and authors must depend upon a publisher
to secure copyright for them, unless they publish their work themselves.
This has led to the common practice of the author assigning all rights in
the work to the publisher, which obtains copyright in its own name and
subsequently assigns the copyright to the author.
II. INDIVISIBILITY OF COPYRIGHT
The indivisibility doctrine states that "the bundle of rights which accrue
to a copyright owner are 'indivisible,' that is, incapable of assignment in
parts."" Thus, it requires a proprietor or assignee of a copyright to hold
all the rights in a copyrighted work. This means that separable rights in
the copyrighted work, such as magazine publication rights, book pub-
lication rights, motion picture rights, and television broadcast rights, can-
not be the subject of separate assignment, but only of license. The full
legal effect of this doctrine is unclear. This is due partly to the fact that
some copyright text writers, who clearly indicate that Goodis' work would
be in the public domain after the serialized publication, appear to have
extended the doctrine further than the courts have."0
ing Co., 120 F. 766 (7th Cir. 1902); Quinn-Brown Publishing Corp. v. Chilton Co., 15 F. Supp.
213 (S.D.N.Y. 1936); Harper & Bros. v. M.A. Donohue & Co., 144 F. 491 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1905).
817 U.S.C. §5 1-215 (1964), formerly Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 5§ 1-64, 35 Stat.
1075-88.
'Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, §5 1-16, 4 Stat. 436-39. See Washingtonian Publishing Co.
v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30 (1939).
1In copyright law the term "proprietor" is apparently synonymous with "assignee." To
qualify as a copyright proprietor one must be the assignee of all rights in the work. This result
was first reached by an interpretation of the 1831 Copyright Act. Mifflin v. R.H. White Co.,
190 U.S. 260 (1903). This interpretation survived modifications made by the 1909 Copyright Act.
See, e.g., Quinn-Brown Publishing Corp. v. Chilton Co., 15 F. Supp. 213, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1936);
Public Ledger Co. v. New York Times, 275 F. 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
" Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, § 4, 4 Star. 437.
2 At common law an author has an exclusive property right in his unpublished manuscript.
He has every right to withhold it from publication. But this common-law right does not survive
general publication. See H. HOWELL, GENERAL PRACTICE-COPYRIGHTS (1954). See also American
Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 299 (1907). The present Copyright Act expressly
reserves this common-law right. 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
sa 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1964), formerly Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, S 9, 35 Stat. 1077.
'4 17 U.S.C. § 8 (1964).
15M. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 119.1, at 510 (1970).
16See, e.g., A. FISHER, STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 642 (mem. ed. 1963); A. LATMAN, HOWELL'S
COPYRIGHT LAW 50 (rev. ed. 1962); M. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 119.32, at 517-20 (1970).
A careful review of the cases cited by these writers reveals that they fall within the subsequent
discussion of this section.
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Pre-1909 Development. One authority"7 has stated that the indivisi-
bility doctrine is the product of an 1854 English copyright case"8 and a
nineteenth century American patent case," and it appears to have been
firmly settled in the United States as early as 1884 that a patent licensee
could not sue for infringement in his own name."0 The desire of the courts
was to avoid subjecting a defendant to a multiplicity of lawsuits. This
distinction between an assignment and a license soon became important
in American copyright law, as the courts began to state that a copyright
licensee could not sue for infringement."
The case of Mifflin v. R.H. White Co."' is worthy of special note be-
cause of its factual similarity to the Goodis case, and because it has fre-
quently been cited for ideas related to the indivisibility doctrine." The
literary work in that case was published serially in a magazine. Only the
last two issues of the magazine contained a general copyright notice in the
publisher's name. Subsequently, the book was published and the author
attempted to secure copyright in his own name. The primary issue was
whether a valid copyright for the benefit of the author was obtained upon
that part of the work contained in the last two issues of the magazine.
Despite the fact that the publisher was a licensee, the Court indicated that
the copyright would have been valid if the publisher had acted as agent
of the author. After noting that the facts did not reveal any such agency
relationship, the Court held that the magazine copyright did not protect
the author's work, and that the serialized publication cast the entire work
into the public domain. The holding of the Court was based upon the
idea that the magazine's general copyright notice was inadequate to warn
the public that copyright was claimed on the book." Thus, the Court's
interpretation of the 1831 Copyright Act, that the terms "proprietor"
and "legal assign" are synonymous, was only dictum. Despite this fact
and revisions made by the 1909 Act, that interpretation has survived'
and has had a significant impact upon copyright law, because of the re-
quirement that copyright notice appear in the name of the author or
proprietor." The Court's indication that a licensee might hold a copyright
for the benefit of the author has apparently been overlooked.
17 M. NrMMER, COPYRIGHT § 119.1, at 510 (1970).
'
8 Jeffreys v. Boosey, 10 Eng. Rep. 681 (1854).
"Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252 (1891).
2OBirdsell v. Shaliol, 112 U.S. 485 (1884).
21 See, e.g., Mifflin v. R.H. White Co., 190 U.S. 260 (1903); American Press Ass'n v. Daily
Story Publishing Co., 120 F. 766 (7th Cir. 1902); Fraser v. Yack, 116 F. 285 (7th Cir. 1902).
'2 190 U.S. 260 (1903).
"aSee Public Ledger Co. v. Post Printing & Publishing Co., 294 F. 430, 434 (8th Cir. 1923);
Borden v. General Motors Corp., 28 F. Supp. 330, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Quinn-Brown Publishing
Corp. v. Chilton Co., 15 F. Supp. 213, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1936); Public Ledger Co. v. New York
Times, 275 F. 562, 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
24See West Publishing Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 169 F. 833, 878 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909).
For situations in which the publisher had the requisite interest to secure copyright, the Miffin case
was effectively overruled by a provision in the 1909 Copyright Act that a general copyright notice
for a composite work would protect all copyrightable component parts. Copyright Act of 1909,
ch. 320, § 3, 35 Stat. 1076.
25 See note 10 supra, and accompanying text.
217 U.S.C. § 19 (1964).
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Subsequent Developments. Many of the cases which have been cited as
support for the indivisibility doctrine involved only the question of stand-
ing to sue. 7 Most of these cases involved a publisher, qualifying only as
a licensee, which had secured copyright in its own name and later at-
tempted to sue for infringement."8 The courts invariably held that the
publisher lacked standing to sue. However, such a holding should not re-
quire that the copyright be held invalid for all purposes. Also, courts have
frequently referred to the doctrine by way of dictum and then held the
doctrine not applicable to the situation before them, 9 commonly because
the plaintiff was found to be an assignee." In a few such cases, the court
even went so far as to state that a copyright obtained by a licensee is
invalid," thus implying that it could not be held for the benefit of the
author.
Parallel to the development of the indivisibility doctrine, a number of
cases were decided in which a copyright secured by a publisher was deemed
to be held in trust for the author as beneficial owner.2 Under this line of
cases, an author might sue for infringement of a copyright secured in the
name of a publisher which was less than an assignee of all rights in the
work, if the author had requested or permitted the publisher to secure
copyright for him. Such a relationship between the author and publisher
might even be implied.2 The result of these cases is that a copyright
secured by someone who is not an author or proprietor may be valid and
enforceable by the author.
III. GooDIs v. UNITED ARTISTS
The decision in Goodis, that a copyright notice in the name of a licensee
is sufficient to obtain a valid copyright on behalf of the author when the
circumstances show that the author does not intend to donate his work
to the public, serves to clarify the application of the indivisibility doctrine.
The court expressly rejected the contention that its holding should have
been precluded by this doctrine. In rejecting this contention, the court
27 See, e.g., Public Ledger Co. v. Post Printing & Publishing Co., 294 F. 430 (8th Cir. 1923);
Goldwyn Pictures Corp. v. Howells Sales Co., 282 F. 9 (2d Cir. 1922); Saake v. Lederer, 174
F. 135 (3d Cir. 1909); Fraser v. Yack, 116 F. 285 (7th Cir. 1902); Public Ledger Co. v. New
York Times, 275 F. 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1921); New Fiction Publishing Co. v. Star Co., 220 F. 994
(S.D.N.Y. 1915).28 Id.
2
9See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284 (1907); Egner v. E.C.
Schirmer Music Co., 139 F.2d 398 (1st Cir. 1943); Mail & Express Co. v. Life Publishing Co.,
192 F. 899 (2d Cir. 1912); Morse v. Fields, 127 F. Supp. 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Kaplan v. Fox
Film Corp., 19 F. Supp. 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
"°See, e.g., Egner v. E.C. Schirmer Music Co., 139 F.2d 398 (1st Cir. 1943); Mail & Express
Co. v. Life Publishing Co., 192 F. 899 (2d Cir. 1912); Kaplan v. Fox Film Corp., 19 F. Supp.
780 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
" See, e.g., Egner v. E.C. Schirmer Music Co., 139 F.2d 398 (1st Cir. 1943); Mail & Express
Co. v. Life Publishing Co., 192 F. 899 (2d Cir. 1912); Morse v. Fields, 127 F. Supp. 63
(S.D.N.Y. 1954).
"
5 See Bisel v. Ladner, I F.2d 436 (3d Cir. 1924); Harms v. Stern, 229 F. 42, 46 (2d Cir.
1916); National Comics Publications v. Fawcett Publications, 93 F. Supp. 349 (S.D.N.Y. 1950);
Cohan v. Richmond, 19 F. Supp. 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1937); Quinn-Brown Publishing Corp. v. Chilton
Co., 15 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1936).
"
2 See White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 139 F. 427, 429 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1905);
Press Publishing Co. v. Falk, 59 F. 324, 326 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1894).
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pointed out that: (1) many of the decisions upon which the doctrine ap-
pears to be based involved a suit by a licensee; 4 (2) a frequently cited
policy for applying the doctrine is to avoid multiple infringement ac-
tions;' and (3) the doctrine appears to be partially founded upon judicial
dictum in cases where the doctrine was held inapplicable. The court
stated that nothing in the established cases required extension of the logic
of those precedents to a case where an author is plaintiff. Obviously differ-
ent considerations apply when the author is plaintiff, as indicated by the
stated purpose of the Copyright Act a" and the decisions in which courts
have recognized this purpose in an attempt to avoid holding that the
author suffered forfeiture."
The court further stated that the Copyright Act supports a distinction
between applying the indivisibility doctrine to cases where the issue is
standing to sue for infringement and to cases where the issue is protection
of the author's interest. The court recognized that one of the purposes
of the 1909 Act was to reduce the number of forfeitures for technical
noncompliance." ' As additional support for the distinction, the court dis-
cussed the change in the method of securing copyright made by the 1909
Act, and then stated that "[t]o require full proprietorship by the initial
publisher would too often provide a trap for the unwary author who had
assumed the publisher would attend to copyrighting the work in his be-
half."4 This latter argument appears to be invalid. Surely not many au-
thors will just assume that a publisher will obtain copyright on their
behalf; but even if they did, a resulting forfeiture should not be considered
harsh. If the author requests the publisher to secure copyright for him,
the situation will fall within the purview of the "constructive trust ""
cases, and the work will not be cast into the public domain even if the
copyright notice appears in the name of a licensee. It is not at all un-
reasonable to expect this minimal amount of action on the part of an
author as a condition precedent to obtaining the statutory benefit of
copyright. However, it seems that this argument of the court could have
been validly presented under the topic of "business practices," of which
the court took judicial notice later in the opinion." For example, in view
of the present-day diverse means of exploiting a creative written work,
it would be unreasonable to require the initial publisher to have full
proprietorship in order to secure copyright for the author.
Although the court recognized existing cases where the publisher was
deemed to hold copyright for the benefit of the author,4 it apparently
3 See cases cited in note 27 supra.
"See New Fiction Publishing Co. v. Star Co., 220 F. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
3s See cases cited in note 29 supra.
"See note 5 supra, and accompanying text.
38 See cases cited in note 7 supra.
"See Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30 (1939).
40425 F.2d at 402.
"' This term is used to describe those cases in which a publisher who had taken out copyright
in his own name was deemed to hold legal title for the benefit of the author. See note 32 supra,
and accompanying text.
42 425 F.2d at 403.
"'Bisel v. Ladner, 1 F.2d 436 (3d Cit. 1924); Maurel v. Smith, 271 F. 211 (2d Cir. 1921);
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could not base its holding on the authority of those cases. The court re-
ferred to those cases in recognition of the fact that courts have been
reluctant to invoke the indivisibility doctrine in cases where the author
is plaintiff. In light of the preceding discussion, those cases could also have
been cited for the proposition that the decision of the court was compati-
ble with the indivisibility doctrine as developed by positive case law.
The opinion is conspicuously bare of any discussion of which facts in
Goodis constitute "circumstances which show that the author has no in-
tention to donate his work to the public .... "" The subsequent publica-
tion of the book with Goodis' copyright notice cannot be considered evi-
dence of his intention to copyright the work at the time he made the
serialization agreement with Curtis, in light of several cases which have
held that an attempt by an author to secure copyright subsequent to
earlier publication indicated that the author had not intended for the
work to be copyrighted by the earlier publication." However, prior to his
agreement with Curtis, Goodis had taken steps to market his work, and
copyright would obviously be required to secure maximum realization
from such marketing. Without the protection of copyright, anyone would
be free to publish and market the work after initial publication. The Court
may have considered these to be the important "circumstances," but it
appears that the court merely used this qualifying statement as a prop,
in an attempt to lean on the authority of those cases applying the con-
structive trust doctrine. In those cases which have applied the constructive
trust doctrine," there were stronger facts on which to base a conclusion
that the author communicated, expressly or impliedly, an intention for
the publisher to secure copyright for his benefit.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the fact that Goodis may have surprised some people familiar
with the area of copyright law," it does not appear to have been precluded
by existing case law.4" The decision should effectively limit the application
of the indivisibility doctrine to the question of standing to sue, as opposed
to the interest required to validly copyright a work. This was obviously
the intent of the court." But at the same time the court may have created
a trap for "unwary authors." In reliance on the Goodis case, many au-
thors might assume that a general copyright notice in the name of their
publisher will secure copyright for them, and then get caught by a future
Harms v. Stern, 229 F. 42 (2d Cir. 1916); Quinn-Brown Publishing Corp. v. Chilton Co.,
15 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1936); Harper & Bros. v. M.A. Donohue & Co., 144 F. 491
(C.C.N.D. Ill. 1905).
44425 F.2d at 399.
' See, e.g., Mifflin v. R.H. White Co., 190 U.S. 260, 263 (1903); Egner v. E.C. Schirmer
Music Co., 139 F.2d 398, 400 (Ist Cir. 1943).
4 See cases cited in note 32 supra.
47 See note 16 supra, and accompanying text.
8 Search by this author has not revealed any case in which an express holding is overruled
by the Goodis case. See note 16 supra, and accompanying text.
4 ""Although we hold Curtis had sufficient interest to obtain copyright in behalf of Goodis,
we express no opinion on whether a publisher in Curtis' position could maintain an infringement
action without joining the author." Goodis v. United Artists, 425 F.2d 397, 401 (2d Cir. 1970).
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